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The Irish private health insurance system is based on voluntary – rather than mandatory – 
take-up, alongside universal entitlement to use the public healthcare system.  Government 
policy in relation to the market includes the operation of community rating, open 
enrolment and lifetime cover.  When the market was deregulated, these measures were 
given legislative status, and provision was made for a risk equalisation scheme.  Critics of 
the Irish system suggest it is heavily regulated and favours the former State monopoly. 
 
Much debate has taken place in relation to the need for risk equalisation, particularly in 
the context of the small number of insurers operating in the market.  However, this debate 
has been largely based on qualitative, rather than quantitative, arguments.  The research 
outlined in this paper attempts to add a quantitative dimension to this debate. 
 
This paper reviews the development of the Irish private health insurance market and the 
literature on the potential threats caused by adverse selection on the part of consumers 
and risk selection on the part of insurers.  An empirical examination is conducted to 
ascertain whether adverse selection and/or risk selection are evident in the Irish market.  
If no such threat exists then the need for risk equalisation might be mitigated.  However 
the presence of one or both of these factors in the market may indicate the need for risk 
equalisation.  Conclusions are drawn and directions for future research indicated. 
 
 
2.  The Irish Private Health Insurance Market 
 
2.1 Legislative  Background 
 
The private health insurance market in Ireland was established with the passing of the 
Voluntary Health Insurance Act, 1957, which established the Voluntary Health Insurance 
Board (VHI).  The aim was to provide the option of voluntary health insurance for the 
15% of the population who, based on earnings, were not eligible for public hospital 
services at that time.  Gradually, entitlement to access the public healthcare service 
increased, with the result that all residents of Ireland are now entitled to access to public 
hospital accommodation and treatment by public hospital consultants, subject to some 
nominal charges for those without medical cards.  Despite this, the proportion of the 
population covered by private health insurance has far exceeded the 15% originally 
intended and currently stands at just over 50% (Source: HIA, 2007). 
 
In 1992, the European Third Non-Life Insurance Directive
1 was passed, requiring all EU 
Member States to facilitate the entry of non-life insurers based in other Member States.  
This directive was reflected in the Health Insurance Act, 1994 (the 1994 Act) in Ireland.  
Among other provisions, this Act defined community rating, which VHI had been 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 
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 operating on a de facto basis.  A number of related regulations were introduced in 1996, 
including those relating to open enrolment, lifetime cover and minimum benefits. 
 
Community rating in Irish legislation specifies that insurers may not vary premiums or 
benefits based on age, gender, current or prospective state of health or any other risk 
factor.  The variant of community rating currently operating in Ireland is single rate 
community rating, whereby all insured persons, irrespective of the age at which they 
enter the market, are charged the same premium for a given plan.  The introduction of 
lifetime community rating, whereby premium loadings are applied the older a person is 
when they first take out private health insurance, is anticipated
2. 
 
Open enrolment mandates that any applicant for private health insurance must be 
accepted
3.  Lifetime cover specifies that insurers may not refuse to renew coverage, 
unless in exceptional circumstances
4.  The three concepts of community rating, open 
enrolment and lifetime cover have become the ‘pillars’ on which the Irish private health 
insurance system is founded, and enjoy broad, cross-party support in the Oireachtas.  In 
addition, the Minimum Benefit Regulations (S.I. No. 83 of 1996) specified minimum 
levels of cover, which must be provided by any eligible plan, for hospital bed charges and 
a large number of prescribed procedures undertaken by consultants – the idea being to 
ensure that enrolees would not under-insure due to information asymmetries. 
 
The 1994 Act also provided for regulations to be drafted introducing risk equalisation 
(known in other markets as risk adjustment or, as in the Australian market, reinsurance).  
This is a system which aims to “equitably neutralise differences in insurers’ costs that 
arise due to variations in the health status of their members.” (HIA, 2007: 11)  This aim is 
achieved by means of transfers of money from insurers with relatively low-risk 
membership profiles to a risk equalisation fund, from which money is received by 
insurers with relatively high-risk membership profiles. 
 
Such regulations were introduced in 1996, but were later revoked in 1999, without 
transfers having been made, pending a review of the health insurance market in Ireland.  
The then government commissioned a report on risk equalisation, which was submitted in 
1998 (Advisory Group, 1998) and formed one of the inputs into the White Paper on 
Private Health Insurance, published in 1999 (Department of Health and Children, 1999). 
 
Following the publication of the 1999 White Paper, the Health Insurance (Amendment) 
Act, 2001 was enacted.  Among other provisions, this Act allowed for the Minister for 
Health and Children to introduce regulations specifying a new risk equalisation scheme.  
These were later introduced in 2003 (S.I. No. 261 of 2003).  It also made provisions for 
                                                 
2 A similar move was effected in Australia in 2000. 
3 The original 1996 regulations (S.I. No. 81 of 1996) specified that this applied only to those aged under-65 
when first applying for health insurance, but this stipulation was removed in revised regulations in 2005 
(S.I. No. 332 of 2005). 
4 According to the regulations (S.I. No. 82 of 1996), the circumstances allowed for are where an insurer 
ceases to carry on health insurance business in the State or where an insured person has committed fraud 
that caused, or could have caused, financial loss to an insurer. 
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 the establishment of The Health Insurance Authority (HIA), an independent statutory 
body to regulate the private health insurance market in Ireland. 
 
 
2.2  Competition in the Irish Market 
 
From 1957, VHI was effectively the only private health insurer in the Irish market.  A 
number of small, mostly vocational-based schemes existed when VHI was established, 
and a number of others have since been established, but these operate on a restricted 
basis, with restrictions primarily based on employment with a particular organisation.  
Having had a 40-year head-start, VHI first faced competition in the ‘unrestricted’ market 
in 1997, when BUPA Ireland (BUPA) launched its first plans.  BUPA withdrew from the 
market in early 2007 and its operations were taken over by Quinn Healthcare.  A third 
insurer, VIVAS Health (VIVAS), entered the market in October 2004.  In 2005, VHI had 
a 76% share of the market, BUPA had a 17.5% market share, and VIVAS 0.5%, with the 
restricted membership undertakings accounting for the remaining 6% (HIA, 2005). 
 
VHI’s competitors have claimed that VHI benefits from an unfair advantage arising from 
its statutory status.  In particular, VHI is not required to hold a minimum level of 
reserves, although it has been accumulating reserves in recent years in anticipation of a 
change in its corporate status.  VHI argues that its statutory status confers it with 
additional requirements, to which its competitors are not subject.  Specifically, VHI must 
seek Ministerial approval if it wishes to increase premiums or launch new products. 
 
BUPA Ireland was a tied agent of BUPA Insurance, part of the British United Provident 
Association, which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK.  It was 
therefore not required to make returns to the Financial Regulator in Ireland
5.  Quinn 
Direct Insurance Limited (trading as Quinn Healthcare) and VIVAS Insurance Limited 
(trading as VIVAS Health) are regulated as non-life companies by the Financial 
Regulator.  Until BUPA’s exit, the three main health insurers in the Irish market were 
each subject to a different prudential regulatory regime, although all health insurers are 
treated equally under the Health Insurance Acts and regulated equally by the HIA. 
 
It is also clear that, despite the presence of competition in the Irish market since 1997, the 
majority of consumers have stayed with VHI.  Research commissioned by the HIA 
suggests that the rate of switching remains low.  Surveys of consumers show that, by the 
end of 2002, only 6% of consumers had switched health insurer (HIA, 2003) and by 2005 
– eight years after the introduction of competition – this number had increased only 
slightly, to 10% (HIA, 2005), which remains relatively low
6. 
                                                 
5 Except as a multi-agency intermediary, in which capacity it was regulated by the Financial Regulator. 
6 By comparison, Buchmueller & Feldstein (1996) found that 3-6% of enrolees in plans that were 
effectively free to University of California employees switched plans between 1993 and 1994 (i.e. a single 
switching opportunity), despite the fact that no cost savings were to be made.  The authors also noted that 
this was consistent with “normal” switching rates for other large health benefit programs with multiple 
options.  It could be argued that there is less choice in the Irish market, due to the low number of insurers, 
but given that the Buchmueller & Feldstein findings relate to switching when no cost savings were to be 
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This research also suggests that VHI has a larger proportion of older, higher-risk 
members
7 than BUPA (the number of VIVAS members found in the 2005 sample is too 
small to draw any conclusions about age profile).  This is partly due to the fact that 
consumers taking out health insurance for the first time tend to be younger than the 
average of the insured population (the 2005 survey shows that the median age at which 
consumers take out health insurance is 28 compared with 43 for the insured population as 
a whole, while the means are 30 and 44 respectively) and partly due to the fact that those 
who switch insurer tend to be younger than average (the 2005 survey suggests that 
switchers had a median age of 39 – mean 39 – when they switched, compared with a 
median age at the time of the survey of 42 for non-switchers – mean 44). 
 
The findings of the HIA that the market equalisation percentage (which can be thought of 
as a measure of the transfers that would take place under risk equalisation expressed as a 
percentage of the claims made in the market subject to risk equalisation) lay between 
3.5% and 5.1% in the six-month periods between Jul-Dec 2003 and Jul-Dec 2005 also 
suggests that a significant difference in risk profile exists. 
 
 
3.  Review of the Literature 
 
Much of the literature in the area of competition in the provision of health insurance 
highlights two issues which are not present in all markets, but may be present in the 
health insurance market.  These are risk selection and adverse selection.  Briefly, risk 
selection involves insurers trying to select favourable risks to reduce their cost base and 
thereby maximise profits, while adverse selection involves consumers selecting more or 
less comprehensive coverage based on their own health status, which may accentuate cost 
differentials between more and less comprehensive cover. 
 
3.1 Risk  Selection 
 
In insurance markets, there exist individuals who represent relatively low risks to insurers 
and individuals who represent relatively high risks to insurers.  In the case of health 
insurance, these are relatively healthy and less healthy individuals, respectively. 
 
The expected value of claims for medical expenses would be lower for a healthy 
individual than for a relatively unhealthy individual.  Although a large number of factors 
will affect the likelihood of claiming for medical expenses, one of the key determinants is 
age.  Studies have shown that average health expenditure rises with age
8.  Therefore, age 
                                                                                                                                                 
made, this would suggest that price, a major basis of competition, was not a deciding factor in this rate of 
switching. 
7 Although age is only one determinant of risk posed to a health insurer, it is widely used as a proxy for 
risk. 
8 For example, Berk & Monheit (1992) show that in 1987, the top 1% of the US population, ranked by 
medical expenditure, accounted for 30% of expenditure, and that almost half of these were aged over-65.  
In Ireland, CSO figures show that 11.2% of the population in 2001 was aged 65+, but ESRI (2006) shows 
that age bracket accounted for 26.0% of total hospital discharges and 44.8% of total bed-days that year. 
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 is a readily available indicator of expected medical expenses and thus of the risk that an 
individual would represent to a health insurer.  However, Newhouse (1994, 1996) 
suggests that age and gender, while inexpensive to collect, only explain a small 
proportion of the variance in health costs, with prior utilisation being the main predictor.  
This point was also noted by Van de Ven et al (1994).  Nicholson et al (2004) find that 
even a simple risk adjustment mechanism based on age and gender would not prevent the 
risk selection experienced by HMOs compared with non-HMOs, because the selection is 
based on other factors that are more difficult to observe, such as health status and 
preference for medical care. 
 
As the payment of claims for medical expenses represents the majority of a health 
insurer’s costs, this means insurers have a strong incentive to select lower-risk 
consumers, if possible, in order to maximise profits.  This is particularly true in a 
community rated market, but may also hold true in a risk rated market, where insurers are 
free to charge premiums based on expected claims.  In such markets, the factors that 
insurers may take into account and their relative accuracy in predicting future health 
expenditures will determine the degree to which risk selection is feasible.  However, 
since there is no perfect predictor of future health spending, an incentive will likely 
remain for risk selection. 
 
Although community rating is often accompanied by open enrolment, whereby insurers 
are obliged to accept all applicants, irrespective of risk, there are subtle ways in which 
insurers may still attempt to risk select.  These would include marketing and plan 
design
9.  For example, additional benefits designed around sports injuries or maternity 
benefits would, ceteris paribus, appeal more to younger consumers, while benefits for 
heart conditions or cancer would, ceteris paribus, appeal more to older consumers.  
Thomson & Mossialos (2007) also note that product differentiation could restrict 
competition if consumers find it difficult to compare price and quality across a wide 
range of products. 
 
In a report by the York Health Economics Consortium (YHEC), commissioned by the 
HIA in 2003, the authors note that, even though open enrolment means that risk selection 
is technically illegal, there remain a number of ways in which insurers could attempt to 
cream-skim healthier lives.  These include “targeted marketing,…structuring insurance 
plans to appeal most to the healthiest…and offering lower premiums in return for using 
service providers who follow strict protocols or other utilisation management 
techniques.” (YHEC, 2003: 50-51)  They further note that, while price competition on the 
basis of efficiency, quality and innovation is desirable, price competition on the basis of a 
lower risk profile (achieved deliberately or accidentally) is socially undesirable.  This 
latter point is echoed by a number of other authors, such as McCarthy et al (1995), 
Mossialos & Thomson (2002a), Newhouse (1982, 1998) and Shewry et al (1996).  It 
should be noted that it may be possible for insurers to attract favourable risks without 
actively targeting lower-risk consumers, although the net result is the same. 
 
                                                 
9 A number of authors have noted this possibility, including Field (1985), Kifmann (2002), Mossialos & 
Thomson (2002a, 2002b), Newhouse (1994), Shewry et al (1996) and Thomson & Mossialos (2007) 
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 A number of authors have suggested that incentives for insurers to risk select mean that a 
fully competitive market for health insurance is not possible.  For example, Arrow (1963) 
notes “The equalization [of premiums between those with a low propensity to illness and 
those with a high propensity], of course, could not in fact be carried through if the market 
were genuinely competitive.  Under those circumstances, insurance plans could arise 
which charged lower premiums to preferred risks and draw them off, leaving the plan 
which does not discriminate among risks with only an adverse selection of them.” 
(Arrow, 1963: 964). 
 
Enthoven (1993) states the issue more bluntly: “A free market does not and cannot work 
in health insurance and health care.  If not corrected by a careful design, this market is 
plagued by problems of free riders, biased risk selection, segmentation, and other sources 
of market failure.” (Enthoven, 1993: 44).  Feldman & Dowd (2000) note, “There appears 
to be a growing consensus that risk segmentation is undesirable, that “risk adjusted” 
payments to health plans are necessary either to forestall risk segmentation or to offset its 
effects, and even that competitive approaches to allocating health care resources may not 
be viable without such adjustments.” (Feldman & Dowd, 2000: 499). 
 
Regarding the reasons for the competitive incentives for risk selection, Rogal & Gauthier 
(1998) note that plans gain more by competing on the basis of risk selection than by 
competing on the basis of cost efficiency and quality.  Dunn (1998) notes that a common 
reason for the implementation of four risk adjustment schemes in the US was the 
reduction or removal of incentives to risk select.  Van de Ven (1990) also notes that one 
of the reasons reforms were carried out in the Dutch health insurance system was the 
incentive for insurers to risk select rather than improve health care efficiency.  Mossialos 
& Thomson (2002b) suggest that insurers in the EU tend to compete on the basis of risk 
selection. 
 
In quantitative terms, Nicholson et al (2004) find that those who switched from non-
HMOs to HMOs used 11% fewer medical services in the year prior to switching than 
those who didn’t switch from non-HMOs, and that those switchers maintained relatively 
low use once enrolled in the HMO.  Meanwhile, those who switched from HMOs into 
non-HMOs used 18% more medical services in the year prior to switching than those 
who didn’t switch from HMOs.  The authors estimate that the effect of these people 
switching is to reduce HMOs aggregate medical expenditure by 2% per annum. 
 
Newhouse (1998) discusses the importance of risk adjustment and suggests that the need 
for risk adjustment stems from community rating, which gives insurers incentives to risk 
select.  Pauly (1984) argues that, under the circumstances outlined by Newhouse (1982), 
the problem is not cream-skimming but rather adverse selection.  He also argues that 
cream-skimming will only occur because of regulation (in the form of community 
rating)
10.  In this regard, he suggests that efficiency may only be achieved by sacrificing 
equity, although he questions whether the notion of high-risk individuals paying more for 
insurance than low-risk individuals is inequitable.  In an earlier paper (Pauly, 1970), he 
                                                 
10 Hartedny (1994) also argues that community rating and guaranteed issue distort the market for health 
insurance and can contribute to making insurance less affordable for younger people. 
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 suggests that community rating leads to a welfare loss relative to experience rating.  
Mossialos & Thomson (2002a) also note the argument that both risk selection and 
adverse selection are more likely to occur under regulatory regimes that restrict insurers’ 
freedom to set premiums on the basis of the risk an insured person represents.  Maynard 
& Dixon (2002) also note that community rating may induce adverse selection and that, 
in the absence of appropriate regulation, market segmentation, cream skimming and the 
exclusion of vulnerable groups could undermine social objectives. 
 
McCarthy et al (1995) note the interaction between risk selection and adverse selection, 
suggesting that risk selection can be used by insurers as a defence against adverse 
selection by consumers, which could threaten their financial solvency.  Meanwhile, 
Shewry et al (1996) note, in the context of The Health Insurance Plan of California, that 
“individual choice is likely to exacerbate any nonrandom risk segmentation that is 
occurring.” (Shewry et al, 1996: 172). 
 
3.2 Adverse  Selection 
 
While risk selection entails insurers trying to enrol preferred risks and avoid higher-risk 
individuals, adverse selection refers to the situation whereby higher-risk consumers 
prefer more comprehensive insurance cover, and are willing to pay more for it, while 
lower-risk consumers prefer less expensive, less comprehensive cover.  This can widen 
cost differentials between the two types of plans. 
 
Adverse selection arises from the fact that there is an information asymmetry between 
insurers and consumers, with the latter having greater knowledge about their health status 
than the former
11.  In many markets, health checks are not required before a health 
insurance contract is issued.  This leaves insurers with only broad indicators of the health 
status of actual or potential enrolees, the main ones being age and gender.  This allows 
insurers to place enrolees in broad categories of risk status, but in community rated 
markets this may not always be reflected in the premiums that an insurer can charge. 
 
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) note that, in the presence of imperfect information, a 
competitive equilibrium may not exist, and even if it does, it may have unusual 
properties.  The authors show that, in order for equilibrium to occur, high-risk and low-
risk consumers must purchase separate insurance contracts.  Equilibrium may not exist if 
the costs to low-risk individuals of pooling with high-risk individuals are low or if the 
costs of separating are high.  Furthermore, even if equilibrium does exist, the negative 
externality imposed by high-risk individuals on low-risk individuals means such 
equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient. 
 
                                                 
11 In a seminal paper on information asymmetry and its effects on the market mechanism, Akerlof (1970) 
shows how information asymmetry can reduce the size and quality of markets or, in extreme cases, cause 
market collapse.  He then shows how these principles can be applied in the market for health insurance, 
where, as the price rises, the average health status of the insured population decreases.  In the extreme case, 
he notes, this could lead to no insurance being sold at all. 
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 Altman et al (1998) introduce the concept of adverse retention alongside adverse 
selection.  Adverse retention is the tendency for people who do not switch plans to 
magnify cost differentials between plans, especially as costs are non-linear with age.  One 
of the factors that the authors suggest will affect the extent of adverse retention is the 
length of time for which the plans have been offered.  The last factor suggests that if 
people do not switch plans to any great extent then adverse retention will drive up the 
costs of older plans relative to newer ones
12.  This suggestion may be relevant in the Irish 
case, given that VHI was in the market for 40 years before their first competitor 
 
A number of empirical studies, such as Altman et al (1998), Cutler & Zeckhauser (1997) 
and Cutler & Reber (1998), show how adverse selection can lead to a ‘death spiral’, 
where more comprehensive plans had to be withdrawn after consumers were given a 
choice between them and less comprehensive plans, or after changes in the way these 
plans were subsidised.  Adverse selection has also been found in other markets, such as 
Australia and Switzerland – see Barrett & Conlon (2001) and Gardiol et al (2005). 
 
Buchmueller (2006) notes two examples of health insurance reforms which resulted in 
overall reductions in health insurance costs to the University of California and Harvard, 
but at the expense of adverse selection death spirals for the more expensive plans.  He 
also cites research that suggests a greater degree of price-sensitivity on the part of 
younger consumers than older consumers, which contributes to adverse selection against 
plans favoured by the latter group.  He also suggests that community rating contributed to 
the death spirals experienced in both institutions. 
 
Ellis (1985), using data from a large US employer, finds that demographic factors explain 
some of the choice between HMO and non-HMO plans, and within non-HMO plans.  
However, prior expenditure patterns significantly improve the explanation of non-HMO 
plan choice, as well as future expenditure.  In particular, expenditure on categories of 
treatment that are better predictors of future expenditure in those categories (e.g. 
prescription drugs) are better predictors of health plan choice than expenditure on 
categories that are not as highly serially correlated (such as inpatient care). 
 
Not all empirical studies find evidence of adverse selection, however.  Buchmueller & 
DiNardo (2002), Newhouse (1984) and Thomasson (2002) find mixed evidence of 
adverse selection effects and the causation of death spirals.  A number of simulations of 
insurance markets however, including Browne (1992), Feldman & Dowd (1982) and 
Marquis (1992), found that adverse selection will manifest itself in markets with low-risk 
and high-risk consumers. 
 
Ginsburg (1985) argues that biased selection goes together with rational choice, and that, 
as insured persons gain a greater understanding of their options, adverse selection is 
likely to increase over time.  However, Pauly (1985) notes that adverse selection would 
                                                 
12 Newhouse (1994) also takes up this point, noting that new insurers tend to appeal more to people who 
don’t already have insurance or those more likely to switch, both categories of which would tend to be 
relatively healthy.  Price & Mays (1985) also note that one possible factor that could give rise to adverse 
selection is if one plan is older and thus has an older mix of enrolees. 
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 not be a problem if community rating and easy switching between policies can be 
avoided.  He questions whether adverse selection really leads to any inefficiency in the 
market, and suggests that inefficiency, in the form of low-risk consumers under-insuring, 
actually arises from the information asymmetry between insurers and consumers. 
 
 
4.  Adverse Selection and Risk Selection in the Irish Context 
 
4.1  Statistical Analysis 
 
An initial review of the data on risk profiles in Ireland, using the consumer surveys 
commissioned by the HIA and published in 2003 and 2005, provides some interesting 
results.  The first survey consisted of a nationally representative sample of 1,001 
consumers, of whom 47% were covered by private health insurance.  The second 
involved an initial, nationally representative, sample of 1,002 consumers, of whom 52% 
were covered, as well as a booster sample of consumers who had switched insurer.  The 
results presented in this paper include this booster sample. 
 
The HIA produces comparisons of plans across insurers, in order to assist consumers in 
making more informed decisions about which plan to purchase.  Using these 
comparisons, it is possible to broadly equate plans with similar levels of cover.  It should 
be noted that there are some differences in cover between similar plans, but broad 
comparisons can be made in terms of hospital accommodation in particular.  This would 
be one of the most important factors by which plans are differentiated, as all hospital 
plans offered by a given insurer would provide similar cover for consultants with whom 
that insurer has contracted and as all insurers contract with a sizeable majority of 
consultants.  The three insurers also cover broadly similar numbers of hospitals. 
 
Table 1 shows a comparison of BUPA, VHI and VIVAS plans that were offered at the 
time of one or both of the HIA surveys, ranked by the highest level of hospital 
accommodation that would be fully covered under the plan
13. 
 
If adverse selection were present in the market, it would be expected that plans which 
provide a lower level of cover, in terms of hospital accommodation, would attract a 
higher proportion of low-risk consumers, while plans providing more comprehensive 
cover (e.g. private rooms, access to the high-tech hospitals, etc.) would attract a higher 
proportion of high-risk consumers, who would be more likely to be hospitalised, or may 








                                                 












BUPA Plan  VHI Plan  VIVAS Plan 
1  Semi-private room in a 
public hospital 
Essential Plan  A/A 
Option 
Me, I and We 
Plans Level 1 
2  Private room in a public 
hospital 
  First Plan, 
Family Plan 
 
3  Private room in a public 
hospital or semi-private 















Me, I and We 
Plans Level 2, 
Teachers Plan, 
Nurses Plan 
4  Private room in a public 
hospital or private room 

















5  As Level 4 or semi-
private room in a high-
tech hospital 
 Plan  D/D 
Option 
I and We Plans 
Level 4 
6  As Level 4 or private 








I and We Plans 
Level 5 
Note: Plans in italics contain significant cover for ancillary (non-hospital) services 
 
Table 2 shows a comparison of plans in terms of the average age of respondents to the 
2003 survey who said they were covered by that plan.  Also included is a comparison of 
the claims experience of respondents on the plans.  The number of respondents covered 
by each plan is also included.  In some cases a small number of respondents were covered 
by particular plans, so care should be taken in interpreting the findings for these plans. 
 
                                                 
14 The Blackrock Clinic and Mater Private hospitals in Dublin are considered high-tech hospitals, as they 
specialise in acute care of heart and cancer conditions.  The Galway Clinic is considered a high-tech 
hospital for certain plans but not all plans. 
15 A limited number of private hospitals are covered by this plan. 
16 Essential Gold was closed to new subscribers in 2004.  However, respondents were found in both surveys 
who had this plan. 
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 Broadly speaking, the average age of respondents with more comprehensive plans was 
higher than that of respondents with plans providing less comprehensive cover.  This 
suggests that younger consumers are more likely to take out less comprehensive plans 
than older consumers.  This would be consistent with adverse selection on the part of 
consumers.  Furthermore, there is some evidence that the likelihood of claiming is higher 
among consumers who are covered by more comprehensive plans. 
 








on plan who 
had made a 
claim 
Average no. 





on the plan 
Essential 1  34  25.0%  2.50  8 
Essential Plus  3  38  48.6%  2.75  35 
Essential Gold  6  47  0.0%  0.00  1 
Don’t know which 
BUPA plan 
N/A 40  19.0%  2.50  21 
Plan A/A Option  1  44  66.7%  3.33  21 
Plan B/B Option  3  43  60.9%  3.98  276 
Plan C/C Option  4  45  59.1%  4.00  22 
Plan D/D Option  5  58  100.0%  6.20  11 
Plan E/E Option  6  51  80.0%  4.50  5 
Plan P, Other VHI, 
Don’t know which 
VHI Plan 
N/A 35  29.4%  2.87  51 
Other Insurers  N/A  42  48.0%  5.33  25 
Overall   42  54.6%  3.91  476 
 
It also appears that the average number of claims made per claimant is higher on the more 
comprehensive plans than on the less comprehensive ones.  However, when the number 
of claims per year insured is examined, there is no clear trend evident, suggesting that at 
least part of the reason why those on more comprehensive plans have claimed more often 
is the fact that they have been insured for longer.  The differential claims frequency 
between less and more comprehensive plans might indicate moral hazard rather than 
adverse selection, although it is unlikely that significant numbers of people would 
increase utilisation solely on the basis of better accommodation in hospital, which might 
not be forthcoming in any case, depending on room availability. 
 
A comparison of broadly similar plans between BUPA and VHI suggests that there may 
also be a certain degree of risk selection in the market.  Consumers on VHI plans tend to 
have a higher average age than those on comparable BUPA plans.  Furthermore, the 
proportion of respondents on the VHI plans who made claims is higher than that for the 
comparable BUPA plans, as is the average number of claims made per claimant, although 
again this is less clear when the number of claims per year is examined. 
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It would appear from the evidence above that risk selection may be present in the market, 
with BUPA having a more favourable risk profile than VHI.  However, it should be noted 
that average age is not necessarily an accurate measure of the average risk posed by 
subscribers to different plans; rather the distribution of members by age would be more 
accurate.  The results from the 2005 data are presented in Table 3 and show similar 
trends, although less pronounced in the case of risk selection by age.  The results for the 
VIVAS respondents are excluded from this table, as there was only one respondent found 
in each of three different VIVAS plans. 
 








on plan who 
had made a 
claim 
Average no. 





on the plan 
Essential 1  40  42.9%  2.83  15 
Essential Plus  3  44  55.9%  3.14  59 
Essential Gold  6  49  60.0%  4.00  5 
Health Manager 
Starter 
4 38  57.1%  2.75  7 
Health Manager  4  41  66.7%  1.60  9 
Health Manager 
Gold 
6 45  100.0%  1.50  2 
Don’t know which 
BUPA plan 
N/A 42  33.3%  2.17  19 
Plan A/A Option  1  44  63.3%  4.33  30 
Plan B/B Option/B 
Excess 
3 46  70.8%  3.79  260 
Plan C/C Option  4  50  70.4%  5.85  28 
Plan D/D Option  5  51  88.9%  2.83  19 
Plan E/E Option  6  46  100.0%  3.00  6 
Plan P, Other VHI, 
Don’t know which 
VHI plan 
N/A 38  59.3%  4.21  66 
Other Insurers  N/A  40  65.6%  6.56  33 
Overall   44  65.8%  3.86  561 
 
4.2  Econometric Results 
 
4.2.1  Adverse Selection 
 
Having examined the data, as discussed above, the next step was to model the data 
econometrically to ascertain whether the same trends were evident.  In order to test for 
adverse selection, it was decided to use the level of cover as the dependent variable, with 
12 
 plans ranked by reference to the level of hospital accommodation provided, since this is 
one of the main differentiating factors between plans (see Section 4.1).  Table 1 above 
shows the ranking on this basis.  Given the qualitative and ordered nature of the 
dependent variable, it was decided to use an ordered logit model
17. 
 
Two main measures of the risk posed by an insured person to an insurer are an 
age/gender combination and some measure of utilisation.  For each data set, therefore, 
these risk variables were grouped together.  The age/gender variables were the age of the 
insured person (AGE), a dummy variable (DUMMALE) set to 1 if they were male and 0 
if they were female, and an interaction variable (AGEMALE), which is the product of the 
person’s age and the gender dummy.  The measures of utilisation available from the data 
are a dummy for whether any claims had been made on the respondent’s policy, either for 
themselves or another named person (DUMCLAIMED), and the number of claims made 
(NUMCLAIMS).  The length of time covered under the policy (YEARSCOVERED) was 
also included to account for the possibility that the number of claims made, and the 
likelihood of claiming, would increase with length of time covered. 
 
It is possible that, as income rises, people can better afford more comprehensive cover, 
which could have an impact on their choice.  In addition to the risk variables therefore, it 
was decided to include variables to try to account for income.  Again, the choice of these 
variables was restricted by the data set, as income level was not explicitly measured.  
However, level of education achieved (EDUCATIONLEVEL) and social class 
(SOCIALCLASS) were used as proxy variables for income.  It could be reasonably 
expected that, ceteris paribus, a more educated person (reflected in a higher value for 
EDUCATIONLEVEL) would command a higher income than a less educated person, 
while a person in the higher social classes, such as AB (reflected in a lower value for 
SOCIALCLASS) would also have a higher income than someone in a lower social class.  
However, social classes F50+ and F50- (farmers with large and small land holdings, 
respectively) might contain a broader range of income than the other social classes. 
 
Finally, a number of other, miscellaneous variables were added to the regressions.  A 
dummy for whether the respondent had a medical card (DUMMEDICALCARD) was 
included to test whether the possession of such a card, and therefore the entitlement to 
free access to the public healthcare system, would lead the card holder to opt for a lower 
level of cover.  An alternative explanation for a negative coefficient on this variable 
would be that many medical card holders qualify for such cards on the basis of having a 
low income and therefore may choose a lower level of cover on the basis of affordability 
(although anyone over the age of 70 also qualifies, irrespective of income). 
 
Two variables were included to test for the significance of life-stage in the decision on 
the level of cover to opt for.  The first was a dummy variable for being married 
(DUMMARRIED), set to 1 if the person was married or living as married and 0 if they 
were single or widowed/divorced/separated.  The second was the number of children on 
the plan (CHILDRENONPLAN).  If these variables are significant and have positive 
                                                 
17 For an accessible discussion of ordered logit models, see DeMaris (1995) and Maddala (1983).  For a 
review of models involving selection, particularly related to health insurance, see Maddala (1985). 
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 coefficients, it might indicate that those with a spouse/partner or those with children tend 
to opt for higher cover than single people with no dependents.  Again, this behaviour 
would be consistent with adverse selection, as those with dependents would bear higher 
risk if they became ill than those without, while the number of children on a plan would 
also increase the risk that such a policy unit would represent to an insurer, due to the 
increased likelihood of a claim being made on that policy. 
 
Another variable included was an indicator of the price sensitivity of the consumer 
(PREMIUMDISCONT).  Respondents to the HIA surveys who had health insurance were 
asked whether they would discontinue their cover if premiums were to rise on an annual 
basis by 10%, 20%, 30% and so on in increments of 10 percentage points, up to 100%.  
This variable reflects the level of premium increases that would be required for the 
respondent to discontinue cover.  A positive coefficient on this variable could indicate 
that more price-sensitive consumers tend to opt for lower levels of cover, while less price 
sensitive consumers opt for more comprehensive cover. 
 
In the 2005 survey, respondents were asked whether they had various other types of 
health-related insurance products (cash plan, critical illness policy, permanent health 
insurance or any other health-related insurance product).  A dummy variable 
(DUMANYOTHERINS) was included in the regression using the 2005 data, set to 1 if a 
respondent had any of these types of insurance and 0 if they had none.  Those who have 
such other products in addition to private health insurance might be considered more risk-
averse.  Therefore, a positive coefficient on this variable would indicate that more risk-
averse individuals tend to opt for higher levels of cover, possibly because they may have 
information about their own state of health that would indicate a higher risk to insurers. 
 
For each data set (2003 and 2005), three regressions were run.  The first included the 
age/gender and utilisation variables only.  The second added the income proxy variables, 
while the third also included the ‘other’ or miscellaneous variables described above. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the ordered logit regression using the data from the 2003 
consumer survey.  The fact that age is significant and has a positive coefficient suggests 
that younger people tend to take out less generous cover, while older people tend to take 
out more comprehensive cover, which is consistent with the presence of adverse 
selection.  However, the gender variable and the age/gender interaction variable are both 
insignificant, indicating that there is no gender effect evident in the choice of cover level.  
In terms of the utilisation variables, both the dummy variable indicating whether a claim 
was made on the respondent’s policy and the number of claims made were insignificant 
in all three regressions using the 2003 data, as was the length of time covered, indicating 
that there is no evident pattern of cover selection based on claims history. 
 
When the income proxy variables were added to the regression, the results did not change 
significantly.  Age remained the only significant variable and there was no meaningful 
change in the pseudo-R
2.  However, when the ‘other’ variables were added in, they did 
have an effect on the results.  Age remained significant and retained its positive 
coefficient, but the pseudo-R
2 increased from less than 0.03 to almost 0.045. 
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The negative sign on the medical card dummy suggests that those with medical cards are 
less likely to take out the most comprehensive level of cover and more likely to take out 
the most basic level of cover, which is consistent with a priori expectations.  The life- 
stage variables were both insignificant.  The price sensitivity variable 
(PREMIUMDISCONT) was excluded from the regression, as when it was included it 
was highly insignificant, reduced the number of included observations by 47 and reduced 
the significance of a number of other variables in the regression and the pseudo-R
2. 
 
Table 4 – Results from Ordered Logit Model with 2003 Data Using Level of Cover 
as Dependent Variable 
Variable Age/Gender  and 
Utilisation Only 















































DUMMEDICALCARD     -1.031148 
(0.608068)** 
DUMMARRIED     0.618275 
(0.380433) 
CHILDRENONPLAN     -0.133065 
(0.103918) 
PREMIUMDISCONT     Not  Used 
LR Index (Pseudo-R
2) 0.026014  0.028604  0.044845 
Included Observations  348  348  348 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard errors 
 
One of the reasons that those who are less likely to claim tend to take out less generous 
insurance coverage is to save money.  However, since the premium is heavily dependent 
on the level of cover (the simple correlation coefficient between level of cover and 
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 premium is 0.86), adding this into the above regression would have been deterministic.  It 
was therefore excluded on this basis. 
 
The relatively low level of explanatory power of the model could reflect the fact that 
coverage for hospital treatment does not vary significantly between insurers or plans, the 
main differentiating factor instead being the level of cover for hospital accommodation
18.  
This would be consistent with Ellis’s (1985) finding that minimising differences across 
plans of features that cause self-selection can reduce such self-selection.  In both 
consumer surveys, approximately three-quarters of insured respondents said that hospital 
treatment was the most valued element of their cover, with hospital accommodation a 
distant second (11% of respondents to both surveys cited this as the most important 
element)
19.  Therefore, to a large extent, choice of plan is not made on the basis of cover 
for treatment, but rather for the ‘hotel’ aspects of plans (i.e. the type of room), which may 
be less likely to induce adverse selection.  This is also consistent with Ginsburg’s (1985) 
suggestion that limiting the benefit structures of competing plans will limit adverse 
selection, since the benefit structures of plans available in the Irish market do not differ 
significantly in terms of the level of cover for hospital treatment, as mentioned earlier. 
 
The results of similar regressions for the 2005 survey data can be seen in Table 5.  When 
using this data set, plans with significant ancillary (non-hospital) cover were excluded 
from the regressions, in order to ensure that this factor did not mask any adverse selection 
effects that may be present
20.  It should be noted however, that this means there were no 
plans at cover level 2 included in the regressions. 
 
These results are somewhat different from those using the 2003 data.  In these 
regressions, age is insignificant, while the number of years covered is significant and 
positive.  This suggests that, although age is not a determining factor in the choice of 
cover level, length of time insured is.  The simple correlation coefficient between these 
two variables is 0.53.  The coefficients on the gender dummy and the age/gender 
interaction variable are insignificant for the most part, although the interaction variable is 
significant at the 10% level in the regression including age/gender, utilisation and income 
proxy variables.  The coefficient on the dummy variable for having claimed is 
insignificant in all three regressions, while the coefficient on the number of claims is 
significant but negative in the last of the three regressions.  This suggests that those who 
made more claims are less likely to take out the most comprehensive cover and more 
likely to take out the most basic cover, which is contrary to a priori expectations. 
 
                                                 
18 Explanatory power for this type of regression also tends to be lower than for many OLS regression, due 
to the discrete nature of the dependent variable. 
19 Similar issues were found in research carried out by the Economic and Social Research Institute, and 
reported in Harmon & Nolan (2001) and Nolan & Wiley (2000).  This showed that the two most important 
factors leading Irish consumers to purchase private health insurance were fear of large medical bills and 
being sure of getting into hospital quickly when treatment is needed, with 88.5% and 86.4% of respondents, 
respectively, citing these as very important.  By comparison, only 27.8% cited being able to have a private 
or semi-private room in hospital as being very important. 
20 No respondents were found in the 2003 survey who were on plans with significant ancillary cover. 
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 Of the two income proxy variables, social class is insignificant in both versions of the 
regression in which it is included, while education level is significant and positive in 
both, which would be consistent with the hypothesis that those who can afford more 
comprehensive cover are more likely to take it out.  Of the ‘other’ variables, only the 
price sensitivity variable is significant, and its positive coefficient suggests that more 
price sensitive consumers opt for less comprehensive cover, while less price sensitive 
consumers (perhaps because they are better able to afford cover or because they are 
knowingly higher-risk consumers) tend to take out more comprehensive cover.  This 
would be consistent with a priori expectations. 
 
Table 5 – Results from Ordered Logit Model with 2005 Data Using Level of Cover 
as Dependent Variable 
Variable Age/Gender  and 
Utilisation Only 















































DUMMEDICALCARD     -0.568029 
(0.564514) 
DUMMARRIED     -0.099803 
(0.342495) 
CHILDRENONPLAN     0.210008 
(0.141837) 
PREMIUMDISCONT     0.013292 
(0.005235)* 
DUMANYOTHERINS     0.428871 
(0.283050) 
LR Index (Pseudo-R
2) 0.039240  0.064082  0.082429 
Included Observations  345  345  309 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard errors 
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 Again, premium is excluded from the model due to the deterministic nature of the 
relationship between premium and the level of cover provided.  Also, the explanatory 
power of the regression is again relatively low, suggesting that other factors, not captured 
in the explanatory variables available here, heavily influence the decision on what level 
of cover to opt for.  However, the inclusion of the ‘other’ variables does increase the 
predictive power of the regression somewhat. 
 
4.2.2  Risk Selection 
 
Binary logit models were used to test for risk selection, using the dummy variable for 
being insured with VHI as the dependent variable.  The level of cover was restricted to 
level 3, which is the level of hospital cover provided by the most popular plans, such as 
BUPA’s Essential Plus schemes (with and without excess) and VHI’s Plan B schemes 
(including Plan B Option and Plan B Excess).  By restricting the level of cover to this 
level, adverse selection effects are removed from the analysis, so any significant 
difference in the age or claims profiles of insurers could be interpreted as signalling the 
presence of risk selection.  Similar regressions for the most basic and the most 
comprehensive levels of cover (levels 1 and 6, respectively) were not reliable as there 
were too few observations. 
 
Again, the regressions contained variables related to socio-demographic indicators and 
the insured’s characteristics.  As with the adverse selection models, three regressions 
were run for each data set – the first using age/gender and utilisation variables only, the 
second adding in income proxy variables and the third adding the ‘other’ variables.  It 
should be noted that, in the risk selection regressions, another age variable, 
AGESQUARED, was included, to take account of the non-linearity that was discovered 
in the age-related propensity to take out insurance with VHI versus BUPA
21.  The income 
proxy variables were included to take account of the fact that VHI premiums are higher 
than BUPA premiums for plans providing similar levels of cover.  (This is confirmed by 
the fact that, if premium was included in the risk selection regressions using the 2003 
data set, it was a perfect predictor of the choice of insurer, while using the 2005 data set 
premium was a significant predictor of this choice, albeit not perfect as Plan B Excess – 
which was not offered in 2003 – was cheaper than Essential Plus without an excess.) 
 
The results of the model using the 2003 data can be seen in Table 6.  The results indicate 
that age is a significant indicator of the likelihood of being a member of VHI, but the 
significance of Age
2 as well as Age suggests that the relationship is non-linear.  The 
combined effect of Age and Age
2 is that younger people are less likely to be with VHI, 
while older people are more likely to be with the insurer.  However, the number of 
claims, when included alongside the number of years covered, is insignificant, although 
being covered for a greater number of years increases the likelihood of being insured with 
                                                 
21 When AGESQUARED was included in the adverse selection regressions, it was found to be 
insignificant, suggesting that there was not a non-linear effect of age on the choice of cover level, and it 
was therefore omitted from the adverse selection regressions on this basis.  Furthermore, AGECUBED was 
added in to the risk selection regressions and found to be insignificant, so that variable was omitted on the 
basis that it appears to be a quadratic relationship between age and choice of insurer. 
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 VHI.  The simple correlation coefficient between number of claims and number of years 
covered is 0.38, which would suggest that it is not multicollinearity which is causing the 
insignificance of the former.  The explanatory power of the regression indicates that other 
factors have a large impact on VHI membership, but that the regression does have more 
explanatory power than those for adverse selection. 
 
Table 6 – Results from Binary Logit Model with 2003 Data Using the Dummy for 
Membership of VHI as Dependent Variable and Restricting Observations to Those 
with Cover Level = 3 
Variable Age/Gender  and 
Utilisation Only 


























































DUMMARRIED     -0.050294 
(0.630846) 
CHILDRENONPLAN     -0.024396 
(0.184009) 
PREMIUMDISCONT     0.009266 
(0.014157) 
McFadden R
2 0.134561  0.143706  0.164497 
Included Observations  290  290  250 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard errors 
 
The addition of the income proxy variables and the ‘other’ variables show that all of 
these are insignificant.  It is not entirely surprising that the income proxy variables are 
insignificant however, as the difference in premium between the standard level plans of 
BUPA and VHI would not likely be sufficient to render affordability a major issue for a 
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 large number of people.  The results do suggest that, based on the data from the 2003 
survey, VHI’s standard plans had a less favourable age profile, although not necessarily a 
worse claims profile, than comparable plans offered by BUPA. 
 
Table 7 – Results from Binary Logit Model with 2005 Data Using the Dummy for 
Membership of VHI as Dependent Variable and Restricting Observations to Those 
with Cover Level = 3 
Variable Age/Gender  and 
Utilisation Only 




























































DUMMARRIED     -0.349543 
(0.458997) 
CHILDRENONPLAN     -0.347543 
(0.159829)* 
PREMIUMDISCONT     0.008937 
(0.006187) 
DUMANYOTHERINS     -0.006815 
(0.376090) 
McFadden R
2 0.057121  0.078060  0.105954 
Included Observations  265  265  239 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard errors 
 
Table 7 shows the results from similar models run using the 2005 data.  As the number of 
VIVAS members in the sample was so small, it was decided to exclude those respondents 
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 from the regressions.  This also allows for more direct comparisons between the results of 
the two data sets, vis-à-vis any selection effects between BUPA and VHI. 
 
Respondents who had plans which provide significant ancillary cover were also excluded, 
as this may affect the choice of plan/insurer but the numbers were so low (only four 
respondents at this level of cover) that the dummy variable for significant ancillary cover 
proved insignificant when included as an explanatory variable. 
 
The same variables appear in these regressions, although the significance of Age, Age
2 
and the number of years covered are all reduced slightly, compared with the regressions 
using the 2003 data, with the last of these being insignificant in the regression including 
the ‘other’ variables.  The correlation coefficient between number of claims and number 
of years covered using this data set is 0.27, again suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
the culprit in rendering the former insignificant.  Again, the results suggest that VHI had 
a less favourable age profile on its standard plans than BUPA had on its corresponding 
plans, although not necessarily a less favourable claims profile.  The explanatory power 
of the regressions using the 2005 data is lower than of that using the 2003 data, indicating 
that other factors account for more of the likelihood of being a VHI member. 
 
The inclusion of the income proxy variables shows that the more educated a person, the 
less likely they are to be with VHI.  If the affordability issue were to come into play, then 
it would be expected that this variable would have a positive, rather than a negative 
coefficient.  The inclusion of the ‘other’ variables reduces the significance of Age and 
makes Age
2 and the number of years covered insignificant, while the number of children 
on the plan is the only one of the ‘other’ variables that is significant.  The negative 
coefficient on this variable indicates that those with more children are more likely to have 
chosen a BUPA plan.  Adding premium or the dummy variable for being a switcher 
significantly improved the explanatory power of the regression but these are somewhat 
deterministic, and their inclusion in the model is not warranted by theory. 
 
It could be argued, however, that the effect being seen in these regressions is not risk 
selection, but rather adverse retention, as outlined by Altman et al (1998), or even a 
combination of both effects.  In particular, an argument could be made that BUPA would 
not have had a chance to attract a similar membership profile as VHI due to the fact that 
it was not in the market for the same length of time.  The counter-argument to this would 
be that any VHI member could have switched to BUPA, although as discussed earlier, 
switching is not common in the Irish market.  Nevertheless, to try to account for this 
possibility, the risk selection regressions were re-estimated, restricting the sample to 
those who had been covered for a maximum of six years for the 2003 survey (since the 
sampling was carried out in late 2002) and eight years for the 2005 survey, in other words 
to those who had taken out their policies since BUPA entered the market. 
 
As the sample sizes were more restricted in both cases, the three-regression analysis used 
above was not as effective, and therefore the results presented in Table 8 represent the 
best models that were found using the restricted sample.  These results show similar 
patterns to the full sample above, in terms of age.  Both Age and Age
2 are significant 
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 using the 2003 data, while Age is significant using the 2005 figures, although Age
2 is 
significant at the 10% level.  The only other variable that is significant using the 2003 
data is education level, and the negative sign on this indicates that people with a higher 
educational attainment were less likely to be with VHI.  This suggests that those people 
who choose VHI do not do so because of being better able to afford the higher premiums 
charged by that insurer.  The significance in the 2005 regression of the dummy variable 
for having claimed suggests that those who took out cover with VHI after BUPA entered 
the market were more likely to have claimed than those who took out cover with BUPA.  
The significance of the dummy for males indicates that they are more likely to be with 
VHI.  Again, the level of education is negatively related to the likelihood of being with 
VHI and is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that ability to afford higher premiums 
does not induce people to join VHI. 
 
Table 8 – Results from Binary Logit Model with 2003 and 2005 Data Using the 
Dummy for Membership of VHI as Dependent Variable and Restricting 
Observations to Those with Cover Level = 3 and who Were Covered Since BUPA 
Entered the Market 
Variable  2003 Data  2005 Data 
CONSTANT  14.60051 (4.405324)*  12.83974 (3.543604)* 
AGE  -0.545397 (0.189091)*  -0.443509 (0.165534)* 
AGESQUARED  0.005637 (0.002079)*  0.003270 (0.001801)** 
DUMMALE  1.875661 (1.765058)  1.821864 (0.808021)* 
AGEMALE -0.014536  (0.042803)   
DUMCLAIMED  0.464181 (0.857388)  2.103362 (0.832100)* 
NUMCLAIMS -0.038434  (0.304699)   
EDUCATIONLEVEL  -0.800110 (0.314189)*  -0.550010 (0.281062)** 
McFadden R
2 0.169378  0.311899 
Included Observations  81  67 
* = Significant at 5% level; ** = Significant at 10% level 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are the QML (Huber/White) standard errors 
 
In addition to re-estimating the risk selection regressions using only those who had been 
covered since BUPA entered the market, regressions were also run to test whether 
switchers had different characteristics from non-switchers.  The models using the 2003 
data showed a non-linear age effect, with older people being less likely to switch, 
although the regressions were insignificant.  This was probably due to the low number of 
switchers (28) included in the equations.  However, using the 2005 sample, which 
included a higher number of switchers, the same age effect was evident, but the 
regressions were significant.  However, the explanatory power of the regressions was 
relatively low, the highest McFadden R
2 being 0.08. 
 
This suggests that the effects seen in Tables 6 and 7 are not just indicative of adverse 
retention, but that risk selection is also evident.  Looking only at those who were first 
covered by private health insurance when a choice of insurer was available in the market, 
BUPA still appears to have a more advantageous risk profile than VHI.  Furthermore, 
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 those who switched (mostly from VHI to BUPA) tended to be younger, therefore adding 
to the more favourable risk profile that BUPA attracted after entering the Irish market. 
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The Irish private health insurance market consists, primarily, of three competitors, BUPA 
(now Quinn Healthcare), VHI and VIVAS.  Features of the Irish market include 
community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover, along with a mandated minimum 
level of cover that must be provided.  The fact that the largest insurer had a monopoly for 
40 years before the introduction of competition is also unusual, if not unique. 
 
The majority of products in the market are structured in a similar fashion, catering 
primarily for hospital treatment, which is what consumers value most highly.  The main 
differentiating factor between plans is the level of hospital accommodation provided.  
This lends itself to examination of adverse selection and risk selection effects.  Analysis 
of data from two consumer surveys indicates the presence of both effects. 
 
In both cases, it is primarily age that provides the evidence for selection effects, while 
claims experience does not show as distinct a pattern.  This could be due to the fact that 
having claimed and the number of claims made are not the most accurate indicators of 
utilisation, as they do not take account of the intensity of claims.  The results suggest that 
older consumers are more likely to choose more comprehensive plans and more likely to 
be with VHI than with BUPA.  The latter finding is also consistent with the notion of 
adverse retention, put forward by Altman et al (1998) and the suggestion by Price & 
Mays (1985) that older plans may have an older mix of consumers.  The fact that VHI 
had a 40-year head-start over BUPA, combined with the relatively low levels of 
switching between insurers and the fact that switchers tend to be younger, appears to be 
contributing to the relatively unfavourable nature of VHI’s membership age profile. 
 
Much of the literature concerning both risk selection and adverse selection suggests that 
risk adjustment is either necessary or a possible solution to these problems.  Evidence of 
both types of selection in the Irish market might indicate that risk equalisation is in fact 
warranted in the Irish context.  Much of the criticism of risk equalisation in the Irish 
context has been on the basis that it is anti-competitive.  However, this is contrary to the 
findings of a number of papers, which suggest that risk adjustment would actually 
improve competition, as it would force insurers to compete on the basis of price, service 
or efficiency, rather than risk profile.  The findings of this research may have 
implications for the debate over risk equalisation in Ireland. 
 
While an examination of the relative merits of risk equalisation in the Irish context is 
beyond the scope of the current paper, it is an area for ongoing research, of which this 
study will form a part.  Another area for further research is whether, or to what extent, 
community rating is the cause of market distortion, although the fact that community 
rating has broad cross-party support would make any dilution of this highly unlikely.  
However, the introduction of lifetime community rating might have some impact on 
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 adverse selection, albeit more likely in the long-run than in the short-run.  It is possible 
that staggered entry of insurers into a community rated health insurance market with open 
enrolment will inherently lead to differential risk profiles, in which case some form of 
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